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QUARTERLY SYNOPSIS OF
FLORIDA CASES*
APPEAL AND ERROR. Issues not raised until appeal. The court will not
adjudicate, on reconsideration of a case, alleged inequities first urged at that
time and never raised in the pleadings or at trial.'
Jurisdiction. Failure of an appellant to conform substantially with the
prescribed form of notice of appeal2 renders the appeal liable to a motion
to quash.3
United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court of the United
States dismissed an appeal and denied certiorari to the Florida Supreme
Court in several memorandum decisions.4  In addition, the highest court
vacated the judgment in an equal protection case, remanding the cause to
the Florida Supreme CourtY
AUTOMOBILES. Tax collection agency. An apparently qualified appli-
cant was unable to secure a writ of mandamus to compel the Dade County
*This issue reviews the cases reported from 47 So.2d 601 (47 So.2d No. 7, Sept. 21,
1950) through 48 So.2d 368 (48 So.2d No. 3, Nov. 30, 1950). It comprises eleven
weekly Southern Reporter advance sheets, containing over fifty Florida cases, excluding
memorandum decisions and a few other decisions not of sufficient importance for dis-
cussion here. Also included this quarter are federal cases dealing with interpretations of
Florida law. Those reviewed appeared from 91 F. Supp. 1 (91 F. Supp. No. 1, Aug.
21, 1950) through 93 F. Supp. 392 (93 F. Supp..No. 2, Nov. 27, 1950) and from
183 F.2d 1 (183 F.2d No. 1, Aug. 28, 1950) through 184 F.2d 576 (184 F.2d No. 6,
Nov. 27, 1950). Memorandum denials of certiorari to the Florida Supreme Court by
the Supreme Court of the United States, reported in 71 Sup. Ct. 1-92 (71 Sup. Ct.
No. 1, Nov. 15, 1950), are footnoted under APPEAL AND ERROR. United States Supreme
Court, Infra.
This issue of the Quarterly Synopsis was written by Marshall Jay Langer.
1. Jones v. Neibergall, 47 So.2d 605 (Fla. 1950). The court did, however, reaffirm
the decree without prejudice to recast the pleadings, present evidence, and secure rulings
on the newly contended equities at a subsequent hearing on a counterclaim. Barns, I.,
concurring specially, would have remanded for the Chancellor's consideration questions
on the equities of the parties.
2. Fla. Sup. Ct. Rule 39-Forms.
3. Brown v. Louisville Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 47 So.2d 862 (Fla. 1950) (notice of
appeal omitted nature of order appealed from, time of its rendition, and place recorded).
4. Only those memorandum decisions which affect printed opinions of the Florida
Supreme Court are listed: Bourquardez v. Florida State Racing Comm'n, 45 So.2d 876
Fla.), appeal dismissed, 71 Sup. Ct. 69 (1950); Rospigliosi v. Clogher, 46 So.2d 170
cert. denied, 71 Sup. Ct. 81 (1950); Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Gentry, 46 So.2d
485 (Fla.), cert. denied, 71 Sup. Ct. 82 (1950); Pawley v. Pawley, 160 F1a. 903, 37
So.2d 247 (1948), 46 So.2d 464 (Fla.), 47 So.2d 546 (Fla.), cert. denied, 71 Sup. Ct.
90 (1950).
5. Rice v. Arnold, 45 So.2d 195 (Fla.), cert. granted, judgment vacated and cause
remanded, 71 Sup. Ct. 81 (1950). See Quarterly Synopsis, 5 MinnM L.Q. 97, 100
(1950).
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'Tax Collector to approve a tax collection agency permit because a popula-
tion act 7 made such approval discretionary.8
Title certificates. The failure of an automobile dealer to procure a
new title certificate within ten days9 of purchasing a used car does not sub-
ject the dealer to forfeiture of the automobile. 10 He should not then be
precluded from offering the former title certificate, endorsed in blank, into
evidence to prove that he is the owner, although he has placed the car on
another dealer's lot for sale."
BILLS AND NOTES, Consideration. Past services which one member of
a family has rendered for another, without contemplation of payment, will
not subsequently constitute consideration sufficient to support an action
on a sealed promissory note against the estate of the maker.' 2
CHATTEL MORTGAGES. Conversion of security. A Florida automobile
dealer who purchased a car with an Oklahoma title certificate, bearing a
notation of an outstanding lien, was held liable for conversion of the security
when he resold the car to a bona fide purchaser. The dealer's reliance on
an affidavit of the seller-mortgagor that the car was unencumbered was not
sufficient to protect him.' 3
CONSTn'U'IONAL LAW. Equal protection. A plan offering Negro appli-
cants for admission to a state university an education at schools outside the
state could not be held to comply with the Fourteenth Amendment.'4 But
one combining this feature with an alternative of securing the desired edu-
cation at newly established and as yet unopened divisions of the state's
Negro college and interim instruction at a state university would seem, at
least to the Florida court, to meet the requirements of equal protection of
the laws.'6
Freedom of speech. Placing heavy reliance upon a recent United States
Supreme Court decision,'6 the Florida court upheld the validity of a con-
6. See FLA. STAT. §§ 197.01-197.07, 197.09 (1949).
7. Fla. Laws 1947, c. 24024.
8. State ex tel. Keen v. Overstreet, 47 So.2d 621 (Fla. 1950)(the act's constitu-
tionality was not in question).
9. FLA. STAT. § 319.03 (1949).
10. Nash Miami Motors, Inc. v. Bandel, 47 So.2d 701 (Fla. 1950).
11. Ibid.
12. Florida Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Miami v. Brown, 47 So.2d 748 (Fla. 1950)
(trustee for payee-daughter brought suit to foreclose a mortgage and note given to payee
by' her mother).
13. Wilson v. Bankers Inv. Co., 47 So.2d 779 (Fla. 1950). Quaere-how did the
Florida Motor Vehicle Department manage to issue an unencumbered title certificate,
so as to make the subsequent buyer a bona fide purchaser, when the previous certificate
showed the existence of a chattel mortgage?
14. U.S. CoNsT. AMEND. XIV, § 1, Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S.
337 (1939).
15. State ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control, 47 So.2d 608 (Fla. 1950); accord,
State ex ret. Lewis v. Board of Control, 47 So.2d 617 (Fla. 1950); State ex Tel. Maxey
v. Board of Control, 47 So.2d 618 (Fla. 1950); State ex tel. Boyd v. Board of Control,
47 So.2d 619 (Fla. 1950); State ex tel..Finley v. Board of Control, 47 So.2d 620 (Fla.
1950). Contra: Sweatt v. Painter, 338-U.S. 865 (1950), 5 MiuMI L.Q. 150.
16. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (four Justices dissenting), 3 MIAMrI
L.Q. 452.
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troversial Miami ordinance 7 designed to prohibit the operation on its city
streets of vehicles bearing mechanical loud speakers used to attract public
notice or to advertise.18 The ordinance was considered as protecting public
safety, and thus not a deprivation of the right to freedom of speech.19 It
appears that the Miami ordinance could have been distinguished from the
Trenton ordinance,20 upheld by the Supreme Court,2 1 in that the latter
law forbids only those loud speakers which emit "loud and raucous noises."
Thus, it would seem that the instant ordinance might be closer to the one
which the United States Supreme Court declared invalid in Saia v. People
of New York.'2
CORPORATIONS. Supplementary proceedings. The use of supplemen-
tary proceedings 23 to pierce the corporate veil of a "one-man" corporation
requires a strong showing to the effect that the corporate set-up was used
to defraud creditors. '24 The fact that the long established corporation was
not carefully managed was insufficient to permit one who dealt with the
corporation to obtain execution against the sole stockholder and his wife.25
COUNTIES. Bonds and revenue certificates.2 The issuance of revenue
certificates for a county health center without the approval of freeholders,27
with principal and interest to be repaid by the imposition of a one-mill tax
by the county commissioners, was upheld as being for a "current govern-
mental need." 28
COVENANTS. Damages for breach. The damages for a partial breach
of a covenant of seisin, requiring the prosecution of an action of ejectment
to secure possession from adverse claimants, will properly include reasonable
attorney's fees and "taxable costs"2 9 incurred in maintaining the ejectment
suit.3 0
17. Miami Ordinance No. 2574, § 195 (Oct. 21, 1941).
18. State ex tel. Nicholas v. Headley, 48 So.2d 80 (Fla. 1950) (relator had been
arrested while broadcasting a speech from a sound truck in behalf of his- candidacy for
the legislature).
19. Ibid.
20. Trenton, N.J. Ordinance No. 430, § 4.
21. See note 16 supra.
22. 334 U.S. 558 (1948) (four Justices dissenting) (ordinance required prior permis-
sion before use of loud speaker).
23. FLA. STAT. §§ 55.52-55.61 (1949).
24. Riley v. Fatt, 47 So.2d 769 (Fla. 1950).
25. Ibid.
26. Three cases dealing with the validity of state and county bonds have not been
discussed. See State v. Florida State Improvement Comm'n, 47 So.2d 601 (Fla. 1950);
State v. Florida State Improvement Comm'n, 47 So.2d 627 (Fla. 1950); and State v.
Florida State Improvement Comm'n, 48 So.2d 156 (Fla. 1950).
27. FLA. CONST. Art. IX, § 6.
28. State v. Florida State Improvement Comm'n, 48 So.2d 165 (Fla. 1950).
29. The court apparently took the quoted phrase from a previous sentence in which
they stated: ". . . some jurisdictions hold that in an action for a breach of the covenant
of seizen [sic] only the taxable costs in defending the title may be recovered." Williams
v. Azar, infra note 30 at, 627. It is to be noted that the breach in the instant case re-
quired successful prosecution and not unsuccessful defense of an action. Cf. Brooks v.
Black,,68 Miss. 161,. 8 So. 332. (1890). Quaere-did the court mean "taxable costs"
or did they mean "reasonable expenses"?
30. Williams v. Azar, 47 So.2d 624 (Fla. 1950).
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CRIMINAL LAW. Confessions. A five line dissenting opinion raises
some question as to the propriety of the court's affirmance of a conviction
of muider.3'
Defendant's right to interview witnesses. The right of an accused to
converse with youthful witnesses for the state may be conditioned, in the
trial court's discretion, to the extent that he or his attorney do so only while
a juvenile officer is present.32
Illegal practice of medicine. The conviction of a male practical nurse
for practicing medicine without a license,35 in that he delivered a baby, was
reversed.34 The court found that he acted during an emergency and, thus,
within a statutory exception. 5  Further, his use of the title "Doctor" was
considered common in view of his actual occupation.,6
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT. Parties and subject matter. The Declara-
tory Decree Act 37 is intended to permit a person to determine his rights
under certain instruments, and not in contravention of them. 8 Thus, the
liberality in the permitted scope of declaratory decrees will not be extended
to a situation in which one, not a party to an instrument, desires a determi-
nation of his status under another instrument in view of the existence of
the former document.8?
DIVORCE. Collateral attack of jurisdiction. Wife number one, victim
of a 1929 Nevada divorce based on constructive service without notice, was
precluded from claiming widowhood as against wife number three.49 Her
evidence as to the lack of bona fide jurisdiction of the Nevada court was
held insufficient to overcome ". . . a very strong presumption . . ." of its
existence and an apparently even stronger one as to the validity of the sub-
sequent marriages. In addition, wife number one's failure to make a timely
attack against the decree's validity was considered to estop her under the
doctrines of laches and equitable estoppel."
EMINENT DOMAIN. Expert witness fees. Generally, fees paid to de-
fendants' expert witnesses in condemnation proceedings will not be taxed
31. Wolfork v. State, 48 So.2d 152 (Fla. 1950). The maijority, without discussing
the facts surrounding the manner in which a confession was obtained, held it admissible.
Thomas, J., dissenting, stated: "Foul as this murder was I cannot bring myself to agree
to an affirmance because I think the confessions obtained in the 'flat top' were not so
free and voluntary as to be admissible in evidence."
32. Baker v. State, 47 So.2d 728 (Fla. 1950) (minor female witnesses were in
juvenile officer's custody for their participation in crime against nature).
33. FLA. STAT. § 458.15 (1949).
34. Baxter v. State, 47 So.2d 764 (Fla. 1950) (three Justices dissenting).
35. FLA. STAT. § 458.10 (1949).
36. See note 34 sdpra.
37. FLA. STAT. §§ 87.01-87.13 (1949).
38. Bowden v. Seaboard Air Line R.R.,-47 So.2d 786 (Fla. 1950).
39. Ibid. (eiectment is the proper action where X and Y each claim the same
property under different deeds).
40. Carpenter v. Carpenter, 93 F. Supp. 225 (S.D. Fla. 1950).
41. Florida law being applicable, Whitehurst, Dist. I., quoted recent pronounce-
ments of the Florida Supreme Court in Pawley v. Pawley, 46 So.2d 464 (Fla.), cert.
denied, 71 Sup. Ct. 90 (1950).
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as costs. 2 Situations do exist, however, in which the taxing of reasonable
fees will be upheld, the matter resting primarily in the trial court's dis-
cretion. 4A3
EQurrY. Laches. A majority of the justices believe that a trial would
be necessary to determine whether there is laches in a situation in which a
former wife waited twenty years, until the death of her divorced husband,
to maintain an action for past due alimony.4' Two other members of the
court, less doubtful, felt that the bill and answer established laches beyond
a doubt, making a trial unnecessary."
ESTOPPEL. Equitable estoppel. The doctrine of equitable estoppel
was applied to prevent a Congressional candidate from attacking the validity
of election laws after he had actively participated in two primary elections
under such laws."
EVIDENCE. Conformance to pleadings. While it is correct and prefer-
able to confine evidence to damages when liability is admitted,47 it is appar-
ently not reversible error to admit evidence as to liability in such a situa-
tionAs
Objections not ruled upon. The failure of a Chancellor to rule upon
seasonable objections to evidence which he permits to be tentatively offered
is deemed as synonymous to overruling the objections.4 9 Where the com-
petency of such evidence is questionable the cause will be remanded with
directions that the Chancellor rule on such objections and then re-evaluate
the entire evidence.50
Ex-ADrrioN. Misdemeanors. The devious crime of desertion and
nonsupport of a wife, a misdemeanor in the demanding state, is an extra-
ditable offense under the United States Constitution1 and the laws of
Florida, " although the accused was not within the demanding state when
the crime was committed and is technically not a "fugitive from justice."C53
FORFEITURES. Strict construction. Currency is not property within the
statute providing for forfeiture of: "All property to be disposed of, or of-
fered to be disposed of, by chance or device under any lawful pretext. .. .
42. Inland Waterway Development Co. v. Jacksonville, 38 So.2d 676 (Fla. 1948).
43. Dade County v. Brigham, 47 So.2d 602 (Fla. 1950).
44. Blocker v. Ferguson, 47 So.2d 694 (Fla. 1950).
45. See Blocker v. Ferguson, supra note 44 at 698 (dissenting opinion).
46. State ex rel. Watson v. Gray, 48 So.2d 84 (Fla. 1950). The feeling of the
court was aptly expressed when Chapman, 1. stated: "The rules of the game usually
are not changed while the players are on the field. It is the writer's view that the relator
has had his three strikes at the ball, and, according to the rules of the game, the batter
is out." Id. at 88.
47. Barton v. Miami Transit Co., 42 So.2d 849 (Fla. 1949).
48. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., v. Wooten, 47 So.2d 743 (Fla. 1950).
49. Godwin v. Holloway, 47 So.2d 824 (Fla. 1950); accord, Thompson v. Freeman,
Ill Fla. 433, 149 So. 740 (1933).
50. Godwin v. Holloway, supra note 49.
51. U.S. CONS?. Art. IV, § 2. See Ex Parte Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 flow. 66, 99(U.S. 1860).
52. FLA. STAT. §§ 941.03, 941.06 (1949).
53. Gatewood v. Culbreath, 47 So.2d 725 (Fla. 19501.
54. FLA. STAT. § 849.12 (1949), Boyle v. State, 47 So.2d 693 (Fla. 1950).
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The decision is apparently in line with previous declarations of the court
that, since the law abhors forfeitures, statutes providing for them must be
strictly construed.15
HUSBAND AND WIFE. Wife's suit against husband for tort. The com-
mon law lives on. Recent statutes,50 increasing the rights of married women,
have not abrogated the restrictions prohibiting suits by a wife against her
husband for his torts.5 7
INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION. Attempted statutory rape. An infor-
mation charging a defendant with soliciting sexual intercourse, but alleging
no ". . . overt act sufficient to establish a criminal attempt," is incapable of
supporting a conviction of attempted statutory rape.'" While the better
procedure would be to move to quash such an information, it is improper
to deny a motion for directed verdict merely for failure so to move. 59
INTOXICATIN. LIQUORS. Revoking license for sale to minors. Applying
something akin to "Western justice"' ' ) the Florida court reversed a fifteen
day liquor license revocation ordered by the Director of the State Beverage
Department for an admitted violation of the statute' forbidding sale of
alcoholic beverages to minors. 2 Where the appearance of the minors indi-
cated the probable veracity of their assurances, in response to questioning,
that they were of age, it was considered that the violator had exercised suffi-
cient diligence.03
LIENS. Equitable lien doctrine. A bill of complaint was held sufficient
in equity when it alleged that an insolvent debtor purchased supplies for a
number of related persons and corporations he controlled, and the bill
sought to charge with vendor's liens the specific properties improved, al-
though the legal titles thereto were no longer vested in the debtor.0 4
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. Bonds and revenue certificates.05 A munici-
pality may issue revenue certificates without meeting the constitutional
55. E.g., General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. State, 152 Fla. 297, 11 So.2d 482
(1943).
56. FLA. STAT. §§ 708.08, 708.09 (1949).
57. Corren v. Corren, 47 So.2d 774 (Fla. 1950)(husband had permitted daughter
to operate family automobile and wife sued for injuries inflicted because of daughter's
negligent operation thereof).
58. Pittman v. State, 47 So.2d 691 (Fla. 1950).
59. Ibid.
60. Terrellism: "in a collection of memorabilia of early Western history there was
discovered the record of the trial of a man for stealing a pair of boots. The boots were
indicated as exhibit A. The verdict of the jury was not guilty-but with the recoin-
mendation that the defendant return the boots. We are convinced that these primitive
jurors had a very discriminating sense of justice that is too fast being relegated to tie
limbo of the law by technical niceties. I am often made to feel that a better brand of
Justice would follow if we cultivated it more." Cohen v. Schott, 48 So.2d 154, 156
(Fla. 1950).
61. FA. STAT. § 562.11 (1949).
62. Cohen v. Schott, 48 So.2d 154 (Fla. 1950).
63. Contra: State v. Schull, 66 S.D. 102, 279 N.W. 241, 115 A.L.R. 1226 (1938).
64. Industrial Supply Corp. v. Lee, 48 So.2d 285 (Fla. 1950).
65. Two cases dealing with the validity of municipal bonds have not been dis-
cussed. See Jacksonville v. Savannah Mach. & Foundry Co., 47 So.2d 634 (Fla, 1950);
State v. Miami Beach, 47 So.2d 865 (Ila. 1950).
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prerequisite of a vote of freeholders66 if it can show that the property to be
pledged will be self-sustaining as to operation and as to payment of interest
and principal. 67
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in construing a tax question, found
that refunding bonds of Florida municipalities do not create a new in-
debtedness, but merely extend the existent debt."8
Demotion of city officer. The demotion of a detective by a police
chief, pursuant to powers given by an ordinance,6 9 was construed as void
when the ordinance was inconsistent with the city's charter70 which gave
the same power to the city manager.7 1
Liability for shooting escaping prisoner. Facts gleaned from a dissenting
opinion show that the court denied recovery against a municipality to the
guardian of an incompetent, for severe wounds sustained by him. 2  A
police officer had shot the incompetent for attempting to escape custody
under a sentence of fifteen days in the city jail for drunkenness.a
Regulating transportation for hire. The legislature may, by special
act,74 authorize a city to regulate motor transportation for hire between the
municipality and city properties located in adjacent suburban areas. 5
Zoning. In a split decision, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit upheld the validity of a zoning ordinance76 prohibiting
the continued operation of gasoline service stations in certain areas after
a fixed date.77
Denial of a permit to erect a church in a residential area of a munici-
pality because of an ordinance 8 requiring off-street parking was considered
arbitrary and unreasonable.79 The evidence showed that the church would
have sufficient off-street parking areas to substantially comply with the
66. FLA. Co NsT. Art. IX, § 6.
67. Wolfe v. Fort Lauderdale, 47 So.2d 781 (Fla. 1950).
68. Mutual Loan & Say. Co. of West Palm Beach v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 184
F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1950).
69. Miami Beach Ordinance No. 893, § 3 (Sept. 7, 1949).
70. Miami Beach Charter, § 13.
71. Simpson v. State ex tel. Perdue, 47 So.2d 783 (Fla. 1950).
72. Goodwin v. Tampa, 48 So.2d 164 (Fla. 1950).
73. The theory of non-liability apparently rested on the basis that the officer had
acted in a sovereign, as distinguished from a proprietary, capacity. Chapman, T., dis-
senting, would have held for the guardian, since the sentence had been imposed for a
violation merely "mal prohibita municipala." He indicated a belief that municipalities
maintain city workhouses for corporate and governmental purposes equally.
74. Fla. Laws 1949, c. 25992.
75. Brack v. Carter, 47 So.2d 986 (Fla. 1950); accord, Pensacola v. King, 47 So.2d
317 (Fla. 1950).
76. Tallahassee Ordinance No. 334 (Jan. 24, 1939).
77. Standard Oil Co. v. Tallahassee, 183 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1950). Agreeing with
the principles of law, but not with the findings of fact, Hutcheson, C.I., dissenting,
stated: ". . . I am in no doubt that in sustaining this admittedly confiscatory ordinance,
a good general principle, the public interest in zoning, has been run into the ground, the
tail of legislative confiscation by caprice has been permitted to wag the dog of judicial
constitutional protection." Id. at 414.
78. Tampa Ordinance No. 1206-A.
79. State ex rel. Tampa, Florida, Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses,. North Unit, Inc. v.
Tamlpla, 48 So.2d 78 (Fla. 1950).
288 MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
ordinance, and that there was little likelihood of creating a traffic hazard.80
NEGLIGENCE. Duty owed licensee. Affirming a directed verdict for a
defendant-landlord, the court upheld a finding that the plaintiff-tenant did
not use a defective attic under a common grant to all of the tenants but,
rather, as a mere licensee to whom the only duty owed was abstention from
wanton acts.8t
Res ispa loquitur. In an action against a "U-drive-it," death and in-juries caused by the overturning of a rented truck due to a severe bending
of the truck's drive shaft created an inference of negligence under the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur. Although the truck was not in the sole control
of the defendant, the court felt that this was unnecessary because of the
circumstances, categorizing the instant case with those of exploding bottles.83
PLEADING. Common law and equity rules. The Florida Supreme Court
has incorporated by reference, for use under the new Florida rules, all ap-
plicable forms under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,84 and has adopted
uniform forms of summons at law and in chancery. 3
While the new equity rules provide that motions to dismiss and for
more definite statements are required to be filed within ten days after a
pleading is served upon the movant, the Chancellor need not receive nor
rule on such motions within the ten day period. 86 This holding would ap-
pear to be equally applicable to the new common law rules.87
Specific allegations. A petition to revoke the probate of a will for
fraud and conspiracy must allege these grounds in a clear, positive and
specific manner.88
Pusutc LANDs. Power to convey. By terming "sovereignty land"89 that
which the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund conveyed in 191i
as "swamp and overflowed land,""0 the court has succeeded in revesting
title to certain lands in the grantor-Trustees."1 The Trustees' contention of
80. Terrellism: "For every traffic injury on the highway about the church you can
chalk up hundreds of them from slips in the' bath room. Perhaps the traffic department
should require more non.skid mats on the floor." Id. at 79.
81. Cavezzi v. Cooper, 47 So.2d 860 (Fla. 1950).
82. Yarbrough v. Ball U-Drive System, Inc., 48 So.2d 82 (Fla. 1950).
83. The court cited no authorities.
84, FED. R. Crv. P. 84.
85. In re: Petition for Adoption of a Uniform Set of Forms for use under the NewRules of Civil Procedure, Fla. Sup. Ct., Jan. 21, 1950. The order of adoption appeared
at 47 So.Zd No. 13, pp. vii-viii, Nov, 2, 1950.
86. Fla, Equity Rule 33 (1949), Strong v. Clay, 47 So.Zd 822 (Fla. 1950).
87. Fla. Common Law Rule 13 (1949).
88. Gair v. Lockhart, 47 So.2d 826 (Fla.), expressly amended sub nor. In re
Ruch's Estate, 48 So.2d 289 (Fa. 1950).
89. Sovereignty lands are tidelands and those under navigable waters to the ordinary
high water mark. Martin v. Busch, 93 Fla. 535, 563, 112 So. 274, 283 (1927).
90. Swamp and overflowed lands are those not fit for cultivation of crops because
of overflow or swamp. Merrill v. Tobin, 30 Fed. 738, 739 (C.C.N.D.Iowa 1887). E.g.,
land above the ordinary high water mark at Lake Okeechobee would be so classified.
Martin v. Busch, 93 Fla. 535, 564, 112 So. 274, 284 (1927).
91. Pierce v. Warren, 47 So.2d 857 (Fla. 1950). But cf. Daniell v. Sherrill, 48
So.2d 736 (F1a. 1950) (equitable estoppel).
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want of authority, because of their own failure to survey and characterize
the land forty years ago, was sustained.92
SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DIs'RIcrs? Finality of trustees' nomination.
An unconditional nomination of a teacher by county school trustees en-
titles him to a peremptory writ of mandamus to obtain a contract from
the county's Board of Public Instruction, in the absence of professional and
moral disqualification?'
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES. Sufficiency of affidavit. A lottery violation
conviction was upset because of the admission into evidence of lottery
tickets seized under a search warrant predicated on an insufficient affidavit.95
Although no specific defects were listed by the court, the entire affidavit
was incorporated into the opinion?6
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. Lack of wife's acknowledgment. For a contract
of sale of homestead property held as an estate by the entirety to be sus-
ceptible to an action for specific performance, it is sufficient that both the
husband and wife sign the contract with two subscribing witnesses present.9 7
When a 1943 statutory amendment 98 proved unsuccessful in abrogating the
requirement of the wife's acknowledgment," the legislature acted again, 10'
apparently more successfully. It is, of course, still requisite that the spouses
jointly consent to the sale of such property, and that both duly execute the
contract.' 01
STATuTES. Construction. The conflict between a municipal license
tax of fifty dollars on opticians, imposed by an ordinance' 0 2 passed pursuant
to power given the city in its charter, 03 and a more recent state statute, 04
prescribing a maximum municipal license tax of five dollars on opticians,
was resolved in favor of the former, the general repealing clause in the
statute being held insufficient to indicate a legislative intent to limit charter
powers.10 5
TAXATION. Homestead exemption. The court is not in complete agree-
ment as to what showing is necessary to establish a right to a homestead
92. Ibid. Quaere-bhow can the court declare that the land was not "swamp and
overflowed land" at the time of the grant in the face of a previous determination by the
federal government so classifying it, when admittedly no survey was taken until 1922?
93. A case dealing with the division of excess fees by taxing authorities has not been
discussed. See Moreland v. Volusia County, 48 So.2d 151 (Fin. 1950).
94. State ex Tel. Lawson v. Cherry, 47 So.2d 768 (Fla. 1950).
95. White v. State, 47 So.2d 863 (Fla. 1950).
96. Id. at 864.
97. Scott v. Hotel Martinique, Inc., 48 So.2d 160 (Fla. 1950).
98. FLA. STAT. § 693.03 (1949).
99. Berlin v. Jacobs, 156 Fla. 773, 24 So.2d 717, aft'd sub nora. Jacobs v. BeIin,
158 Fla. 259, 28 So.2d 539 (1946). See Comment, Married Women's Acknowlecge-
meits in Florida, 1 MIAMI L.Q. 37 (1947).
100. FLA. STAT. § 708.07 (1949).
101. See Scott v. Hotel Martinique, Inc., 48 So.2d 160, 161 (Fla. 1950).
102. St. Petersburg Ordinance No. 1103B (1948).
103. St. Petersburg Charter, § 3 (1931).
104. FLA. STAT. § 484.10 (1949).
105. St. Petersburg v. Siebold, 48 So.2d 291 (Fla. 1950).
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exemption. A bare majority of the justices denied an exemption to an
elderly widow who rented her homestead while in a nursing home.1°0
Pari-mutuel revenues. The legislature cannot, by special act, 107 require
a county to distribute a portion of its pari-mutuel revenues to a municipal-
ity. 1°8 It is only by constitutional authority0" that the state may give these
funds to the county and, once given, they must be used for county
purposes.' HO
Tangible personal property. No tax need be paid on tangible personal
property which a taxpayer acquires or brings into the taxing county after
January 1st of the taxable year."'
Tax deeds. County and municipal tax deeds, issued in compliance
with state statutes but not in compliance with the provision of the Soldiers'
and Sailors' Civil Relief Act Amendments of 1942112 tolling the period for
redemption of tax certificates on servicemen's real property, are void as
prematurely issued tax deeds,113 and will be cancelled upon payment of all
amounts required by statute.1 Thus, the necessary two year period had not
elapsed between the issuance of the certificates in July 1941 and the issuance
of the deeds in October 1943, since the tolling occurred with the passage of
the relief provision in October 1942.115
TELECRAPHS, TELEPuONES AND RADIO. Police power. Having recently
approved a tightening of state control over private wire service," 6 the court
continued to plug loopholes in the field of disseminating gambling infor-
mation. Dealing this time with public wire service, the supreme court found
that it was within the power of the Railroad and Public Utilities Commis-
sion to promulgate a rule prohibiting the use of public means of communi-
cation for unlawful purposes." 7 Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph
106. McCullough v. Forbes, 47 So.2d 780 (Fla. 1950)(widow stored her furniture
in attic and intended to return as soon as practicable, the lease being month to month).
Speaking for the minority Chapman, J. felt that such facts did not warrant a deprivation
of rights intended by the framers of our constitution to "... shelter the family in times
of disaster and misfortune."
107. Fla. Laws 1949, c. 25015.
108. Lynn Haven v. Bay County, 47 So.2d 894 (Fla. 1950).
109. FLA. CoNsT. Art. IX § 15.
110. The court noted this to be the only exception to "... the general rule that
state taxes may be expended only for state purposes; that county taxes may be expended
only for county purposes." Once distributed, the funds become county funds, no longer
within the constitutional exception and therefore back within the general rule.
11. FLA. STAT. §§ 192.04, 193.11 (1949), Overstreet v. Ty-Tan, Inc., 48 So.2d
158 (Fla. 1950).
112. 54 STAT. 1178 (1940), as amended, 56 STAT. 769 (1942), 50 U.S.C. APP.
§ 525 (1946).
113. Burke v. O'Brien, 47 So.2d 777 (Fla. 1950) (state and federal provisions must
be construed together).
114. See FLA. STAT. § 196.07 (1949).
115. Cf. LeMaistre v. Leffers, 333 U.S. 1 (1948) (certificate holder had become
entitled to tax deed before owner came under protection of relief act).
116. FLA. STAT. §§ 365.01-365.14 (1949)("Bookie Wire Law"), Melnerney v.
Ervin, 46 So.Zd 458 (Fla. 1950), 4 MIAT1 L.Q. 515.
117. Dade County News Dealers Supply Co. v. Florida R.R. & Pub. Util. Comm'n,
48 So.2d 89 (Fla. 1950).
QUARTERLY SYNOPSIS OF FLORIDA CASES
Company was thus warranted in depriving a subscriber of service upon noti-
fication by the Attorney General that the service was being used to violate
laws." 8
TIME. Computation in limitation of actions. In a tort action, with a
four year statute of limitation," 9 the general rule for computing time 20
will be applied, excluding the day on which the cause of action arose and
including the last day of the limitation period. 1 1
TRIAL. Instructions to jury. A charge to the effect that a home owner
need not take apart a cauopy on his premises to ascertain whether a painter
might be working iunder unsafe conditions was a factual charge 22 and,
therefore, erroneous.' -' Similarly, it was prejudicial error to instruct the
jury that the painter and the owner each had the same degree of responsi-
bility in determining the existence of danger. 24 Another charge, that the
jury must find for the defendant owner if it was merely convenient, as dis-
tinguished from necessary, that the painter be on the canopy, was also held
incorrect'
2 -5
URSURY. Contract of sale. The election, by the purchaser of a used
automobile, of a deferred payment plan in preference to a single cash pay-
ment does not subject the retain title contract to the charge of usury merely
because the difference in price under the two plans is greater than an
amount equal to the permitted rate of interest.'26
VENUE. Waiver. The filing of a demurrer to a declaration constitutes
a waiver of the privilege of venue.' 27
WITNESSES. Expert witness fees. An expert witness may be compen-
sated only for the time he spends at the place of trial and not for the time
during which he is ready to report upon receipt of a telephone call. t28 It is
within the trial court's discretion, however, to pay an expert witness the
maximum hourly statutory fee for fractional parts of an hour.129
118. Ibid.
119. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4) (1949), Warner v. Ware, 136 Fla. 466, 182 So. 605(1938) (four year limitation applies to tort actions).
120. E.g., Blanton v. State ex rel. Miller, 156 Fla. 694, 24 So.2d 232 (1945); Young
v. Young, 152 Fla. 712, 12 So.2d 885 (1943).
121. McMillen v. Hamilton, 48 So.2d 162 (Fla. 1950)(cause not barred where
injury occurred Oct. 27, 1945 and summons both issued and delivered to sheriff for
service on Oct. 27, 1949, although summons not served until next day).
122. FLA. STAT. § 54.17 (1949).
123. Hall v. Holland, 47 So.2d 889 (Fla. 1950)(The defendant-owner had em-
ployed a carpenter to repair a defective canopy, without obtaining a required building
permit. The canopy was fastened to a wall by three 16-penny nails, and it fell and
injured the plaintiff.painter when he went on it to paint a portion of the home.).
124. Ibid.
125. Ibid.
126. Nelson v. Scarritt Motors, Inc., 48 So.2d 168 (Fla. 1950) (authorities differ
as to whether usury statutes, generally applied only to loan contracts, should also be
directed against sales contracts); accord, Davidson v. Davis, 59 Fla. 476, 62 So. 139(1910) (contract for sale of land).
127. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc. v. Wooten, 47 So.2d 743 (Fla. 1950).
128. FLA. STAT. § 90.231 (1949), Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc. v. Wooten, 47 So.2d
743 (Fla. 1950).
129. Ibid.
